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The Power of “We”:
Effects of Psychological Collectivism on Team Performance Over Time
Erich C. Dierdorff, Suzanne T. Bell, and James A. Belohlav
DePaul University
We examined the influences of different facets of psychological collectivism (Preference, Reliance,
Concern, Norm Acceptance, and Goal Priority) on team functioning at 3 different performance depictions: initial team performance, end-state team performance, and team performance change over time. We
also tested the extent to which team-member exchange moderated the relationships between facets of
psychological collectivism and performance change over time. Results from multilevel growth modeling
of 66 teams (N ⫽ 264) engaged in a business simulation revealed differential effects across facets of
psychological collectivism and across different performance measurements. Whereas facets concerned
with affiliation (Preference and Concern) were positively related to initial team performance, reliance
was negatively related to initial team performance. Goal Priority was a strong predictor of end-state
performance. Team-member exchange moderated the relationship between performance change and 3 of
the 5 facets of psychological collectivism (Preference, Reliance, Norm Acceptance). Implications for
team composition and team training are discussed.
Keywords: collectivism, team performance, longitudinal performance, TMX, multilevel modeling

Earley & Gibson, 1998; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002;
Triandis, Chan, Bhawuk, Iwao, & Sinha, 1995) that one reason for
the paucity of empirical work stems from various psychometric
shortcomings associated with collectivism measures. Recognizing
these reliability and validity problems, Jackson et al. (2006) recently developed a new measure of collectivism derived from an
integrative conceptual review of existing scales. Their multifaceted
measure of psychological collectivism is designed to capture individual differences (vs. cultural differences) in collectivism. In
addition to offering supportive evidence of the construct-related
validity of this measure, Jackson et al. presented findings linking
psychological collectivism to several important individual-level
outcomes for people working in team contexts. For example,
psychological collectivism was shown to be positively associated
with supervisor ratings of team-member task performance and
citizenship behavior and negatively associated with counterproductive work behavior and withdrawal behavior. The particular
facets of psychological collectivism also displayed differential
prediction across these four outcomes, further suggesting that a
more nuanced view of psychological collectivism can lend valuable insight into how this construct relates to team functioning.
Although the preliminary results for the influence of psychological collectivism on team-member behavior are indeed promising, additional research that focuses on psychological collectivism
as a team composition variable is clearly needed. Therefore, we
sought to extend this nascent research domain in three important
ways. First, we examined whether average individual psychological collectivism within a team was predictive of team performance, which allowed us to test whether elevated levels of the
psychological collectivism facets were predictive of performance
at the team level. This approach extends the work by Jackson et al.
(2006), which focused on individual-level outcomes, by directly
investigating the consequences of psychological collectivism on

There is substantial consensus that an essential component of
effective team functioning is cooperation among individual members (LePine, Hanson, Borman, & Motowidlo, 2000; Stevens &
Campion, 1994). As such, identifying the factors that account for
differences in the extent to which individuals exhibit cooperative
behaviors and, ultimately, differences in team performance is often
cited as an important issue both for organizational research and for
human resource practice (Wagner, 1995). One factor purported to
enhance individuals’ propensities to cooperate in team contexts is
collectivism (Cox, Lobel, & McLeod, 1991; Earley & Gibson,
1998; Wagner, 1995). In a broad sense, collectivism represents the
degree to which individuals hold a general orientation toward
group goals, a concern for the well-being of the group and its
members, an acceptance of group norms, and a tendency toward
cooperation in group contexts (Triandis, 1995; Wagner, 1995;
Wagner & Moch, 1986). For these reasons, collectivism would
seem a logical and fruitful construct to examine for its influence on
how teams function.
Yet, whether or not collectivism actually predicts performance
in team contexts remains largely unexplored (Jackson, Colquitt,
Wesson, & Zapata-Phelan, 2006). Several authors have noted (e.g.,
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team outcomes. Second, we examined how psychological collectivism affects team performance as it unfolds over time. Such
longitudinal investigations are essential for understanding team
functioning and performance, primarily because teams are now
widely conceptualized as adaptive and dynamic systems (Ilgen,
Hollenbeck, Johnson, & Jundt, 2005; McGrath, Arrow, & Berdahl,
2000; Mohammed, Hamilton, & Lim, 2008). We tested psychological collectivism for its potential effects on three performance
time points: (a) the team’s initial performance level, (b) the team’s
end-state or final performance level, and (c) the team’s performance change over time. Third, we explicitly incorporated an
assessment of team members’ perceptions of the quality of cooperation among team members by using a measure of team-member
exchange (Seers, 1989). The perceived quality of exchanges may
influence team members’ motivation to continue to expend teamdirected efforts and consequently attenuate or amplify the effects
of psychological collectivism on team performance over time.
In the following sections, we discuss the dynamic nature of team
performance and how psychological collectivism shapes such performance. We develop hypotheses for the effects of different facets
of psychological collectivism on team performance at various
temporal stages. We then describe the moderating role that team
members’ perceptions of the quality of cooperation play in relation
to the effects of psychological collectivism facets on longitudinal
changes in team performance.

Psychological Collectivism and Team-Level
Performance
Although collectivism has historically been studied at the cultural level (Hofstede, 2001), more recent research has begun to
examine collectivism as an individual difference variable in team
settings (Eby & Dobbins, 1997; Kirkman & Shapiro, 2001). Given
that individuals with higher collectivistic orientations base their
identity on group membership as well as value interdependence
and the group over themselves, teams composed of more collectivistic individuals should engage in behaviors that promote the
effective functioning of the team. The limited empirical research
investigating collectivism as a team compositional variable is
generally supportive of this notion. For example, in teams composed of highly collectivistic individuals, members give more
emotional, informational, and appraisal support to one another
than do members of teams composed of those low on collectivism
(Drach-Zahavy, 2004). The proportion of highly collectivistic individuals on a team is related to cooperation in teams (Eby &
Dobbins, 1997). Finally, research has shown higher psychological
collectivism of team members to be associated with increased
citizenship behavior among these individuals (Jackson et al.,
2006). Given the link between collectivism and supportive teamwork behaviors and the importance of these behaviors for team
performance, it follows logically that teams comprising more
psychologically collectivistic members should perform more effectively than teams comprising less psychologically collectivistic
members.
Jackson et al. (2006) described five specific facets of psychological collectivism: Preference, Concern, Reliance, Norm Acceptance, and Goal Priority. Although all of these facets should
promote cooperation in teams and ultimately benefit performance,
the facets are thought to promote cooperation for different reasons.

For example, Preference and Concern reflect a sense of attraction
to the group, and this affinity toward the group promotes cooperation. Goal Priority and Reliance are thought to support cooperation by fostering goal and task interdependence. Finally, Norm
Acceptance is thought to benefit cooperation through the development of shared norms and prosocial behavior. Given the different
avenues through which these facets should facilitate cooperation, it
is also likely that the facets of psychological collectivism will
show differential relationships with how teams perform over time.
Jointly considering the nature of team performance and the
distinct facets of psychological collectivism can contribute to our
understanding of the relationship between collectivism and team
performance. Despite the widespread agreement that team performance is dynamic and the importance of time in theories of team
performance (e.g., Kozlowski, Gully, Nason, & Smith, 1999),
longitudinal studies that examine the temporal nature of predictors
of team performance are rare (Mohammed et al., 2008). Kozlowski
et al. (1999) suggested that newly formed teams shift from being
a collection of individuals to a fully functioning interdependent
team via a compilation process. In other words, effective teams do
not start initially with their full capabilities; instead, they form,
establish regulatory mechanisms, and evolve over time (Kozlowski
et al., 1999). The compilation process for teams is a continuous set
of phases: team formation, task compilation, role compilation, and
team compilation. During team formation, individuals come together and seek information about one another and the basic nature
of the team, including its purpose. During task compilation, individuals try to demonstrate their task competencies to one another
and are focused on what they need from one another. During role
compilation, team members begin to connect with one another and
figure out how their actions affect other members. Members also
focus on having their needs met and what they must do to help
others. During the final phase (team compilation), team members
learn how to improve their network of roles and to deal with
routine and normative situations. Given the different primary concerns of teams through the compilation process, some factors are
thought to be more important than others during specific phases.
Teams that effectively develop performance capabilities appropriate to the different phases should more effectively navigate the
compilation process and display better team performance at measurements consistent with these phases.
In the ensuing paragraphs, we use Kozlowski et al.’s (1999)
theory of compilation and performance to describe how facets of
psychological collectivism are related to initial and end-state performance, as well as changes in team performance over time. Two
important caveats should be noted. First, we do not directly test
Kozlowski et al.’s theory; rather, we use it at a global level of
specificity. That is, we rely on the theory as a conceptual backdrop
to inform hypothesis building around the effects of psychological
collectivism on team performance over time. For example, we
expect measures of initial team performance to be reflective of a
team in early stages of development (i.e., team formation) and
measures of end-state team performance (after several weeks of
interaction) to be reflective of a team in later stages of team
development (e.g., team compilation). However, we do not directly
test specific propositions of the theory, such as phase transitions
and shifts in focal level (individual to dyad to team). Second,
although we expect facets of psychological collectivism to be
highly related and to some degree have effects on performance
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Hypothesis 2: Average team-member Concern is positively
related to initial team performance.

reliance members may not navigate team formation as effectively. Individuals high on the Reliance facet believe that one
person’s responsibility is the responsibility of the entire group.
Moreover, they have a collective sense of responsibility that
leads them to feel comfortable relying on and trusting in the
group (Jackson et al., 2006). Although this willingness to rely
on one another may be important for effective team performance once roles are defined and an understanding of the team
has developed, a general willingness to rely on the team may
have a negative effect on early team performance (i.e., during
team formation). For example, viewing the team task as a
purely shared responsibility at the outset could result in poor
initial performance, because feelings of personal responsibility
might be limited when team members interact with the team
(Kerr & Bruun, 1983; Sweeney, 1973).
The collective effort model (Karau & Williams, 1993) suggests
that team members are willing to exert effort on a collective task
only to the extent that they expect their individual efforts to be
instrumental in obtaining valued outcomes. An application of
expectancy theory of motivation to team performance, the collective effort model holds that a team member must see the link
between individual performance and team performance (expectancy), see the link between team performance and team outcomes
(instrumentality), and value the team outcomes (valence). Early in
the compilation process, teams are collections of individuals still
working to form a team identity, and thus norms are being developed, roles are not yet assigned, and the strengths and weakness of
the different team members are not yet understood. Teams composed of members low on Reliance may work harder to understand
what each team member can contribute to the larger team assignments. They also put systems in place (e.g., checks, deadlines,
team charters) in order to formalize the extent to which team
members can be relied upon. Formal planning activities, such as
the creation of team charters and performance strategies, have been
show to have positive effect on team performance both early in a
team’s history and over time (Mathieu & Rapp, 2009). A more
deliberate attempt to understand the particular team and its members should lead to more effective team formation and, thus, to
better early team performance. Team members low on Reliance
may see their individual performance as critical to the team’s
success (i.e., they are not sure whether or not they can rely on other
team members) and may expend more effort than team members
high on Reliance. Further, teams early in the compilation process
reflect a collection of individuals working coactively rather than a
highly interdependent team. Individuals low on collectivism tend
to work harder in situations when working coactively rather than
interdependently, whereas individuals high in collectivism work
harder when working interdependently rather than coactively
(B. N. Smith, 2002). Because the team formation phase requires
individuals to come to an understanding of the specific team of
which they are a part, teams composed of low-reliance members
may apply more effort toward navigating team formation and may
have higher initial team performance than teams composed of
high-reliance members.

Although team members’ affinity toward the team should be
helpful for early team performance, teams composed of high-

Hypothesis 3: Average team-member Reliance is negatively
related to initial team performance.

throughout a team’s development, we argue that some facets are
more likely to exert influence at particular periods of performance
measurement. Thus, when developing hypotheses we necessarily
emphasize predictions for those facets most likely to be influential
for team performance measured at specific stages of team development.

Initial Team Performance
During team formation, individuals socialize into the team and
try to develop an understanding of the new team situation. The
initial focus of team members is thought to be that of new team
members working toward reducing social ambiguity with the other
members. Team members also gain basic knowledge about the
team itself (e.g., its goal, climate, norms) and begin to understand
where their individual roles align with team goals. Key outcomes
of team formation are knowledge about social relationships and an
orientation to the team as a whole, including developing a commitment to team goals, climate perceptions, and behavioral norms
(Kozlowski et al., 1999). Teams that can more quickly and effectively navigate through team formation can turn their focus to task
performance. An underlying motivation for collectivists is thought
to be the propensity to associate with social units in order to
establish their own self-concepts (Shamir, 1990). Because the
identities of collectivistic individuals are based on social contexts,
these individuals should more easily identify with the team and
thereby align more easily with the team’s agenda (Gundlach,
Zivnuska, & Stoner, 2006). Facets of collectivism that are associated with affiliation, such as Preference and Concern, should be
particularly important for early team performance.
In particular, individuals high on the Preference facet emphasize
relationships with in-group members and prefer to exist within the
bounds of a group (Jackson et al., 2006). Because they believe that
affiliated efforts are superior to individual efforts, individuals high
on Preference should be inherently more interested in aligning
themselves with other team members and be more motivated to
align their roles with the team’s purpose. In addition, if teams are
composed of high-Preference individuals, movement toward a
focus on the group should be easier and quicker for those teams.
Similarly, individuals high on the Concern facet are motivated by
a concern for the well-being of the entire group and its members
(Jackson et al., 2006). As such, individuals high on Concern
should be interested in gaining knowledge about other team members and want to develop an understanding of their needs. This
concern for others should help teams composed of high-Concern
individuals shift from a self-view to a team view of performance.
Because Preference and Concern reflect affinity toward the team
and its members, teams composed of members high on Preference
and Concern should more easily navigate through the team formation phase and have stronger initial team performance than should
teams composed of members low on Preference and Concern.
Hypothesis 1: Average team-member Preference is positively
related to initial team performance.
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End-State Team Performance

During late phases of team development, such as team compilation, team members focus on improving their current network of
roles needed for effective team functioning. Dealing with normative routines for task performance, as well as novel situations, is
commonplace in the team compilation phase. Thus, more effective
teams at this late phase should be those in which team members
have established a thorough understanding and acceptance of the
team’s performance norms and a strong commitment to the team’s
performance goals. Highly collectivistic individuals are more
likely to form strong bonds with other team members and more
likely to make personal sacrifices for the good of the group (Ho &
Chiu, 1994; Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis, 1995). Therefore,
facets of psychological collectivism that facilitate internalization
of team norms (e.g., Norm Acceptance) and promote a stronger
emphasis on team needs versus individual needs (e.g., Goal Priority) should be particularly important.
The reason for the importance of these facets is that commitment to team goals and understanding of team norms serve as the
initial foundation for ensuing performance (Kozlowski et al.,
1999). The implication for team functioning is that Norm Acceptance and Goal Priority are most likely to impact later phases of
team development, when the effects of these facets will have had
sufficient time to manifest. Because teams are developing their
norms and aligning individual and team goals in early phases of
team development (making attraction and a willingness to rely on
the team important), there will not have been a chance for issues
of norm compliance and whether or not team members are motivated to work toward the identified team goals to affect early
measures of team performance. Once teams are in the later phases
of team development, however, Goal Priority and Norm Acceptance should have a strong influence on team performance because
they directly benefit the cooperation required by the interdependence of the defined team task, even more so than the facets
focused on attraction and reliance.
Team members high on Norm Acceptance focus on the norms
and rules of the in-group and comply with these norms in order to
foster harmony with the team (Jackson et al., 2006). Individual
attitudes and preferences are secondary to team norms for these
team members (Ho & Chiu, 1994; Triandis, 1995). Team norms
are an essential component of effective and efficient team functioning (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1991; Wageman, 1997) because, when accepted by team members, they promote consensus
on the proper way to approach and accomplish the team’s task
(Chatman & Flynn, 2001). Although norms are thought to form in
early development phases (Kozlowski et al., 1999), research has
shown that early norm formation is often based on inadequate
understanding of the required tasks to be undertaken and that
norms are frequently modified over time (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985). These findings suggest that the effects of the Norm
Acceptance facet of psychological collectivism are likely to be
seen in specific relation to end-state team performance, when
sufficient time has passed for team norms to be routinized into
team functioning or modified to improve their effectiveness.
Hypothesis 4: Average team-member Norm Acceptance is
positively related to end-state team performance.

Team members high on Goal Priority are guided by a consideration for the in-group’s interests. With these individuals, team
goals take precedence over individual goals even when it causes
them to make sacrifices (Jackson et al., 2006). In this sense, team
members high on Goal Priority confer primacy to goals of the team
rather than their own personal goals (Triandis, 1995). Because
goals increase effort toward the goal-related task (Locke &
Latham, 2002), team members with high Goal Priority should have
motivation, maintain effort, and persist toward team goals. Although Goal Priority may not influence early team performance
before team goals have been identified or persistence on the team
task is required, teams composed of members who consistently
value team goals over their individual goals should outperform
teams composed of members with low Goal Priority. Further it is
not until the last phase of compilation (i.e., team compilation) that
interdependent interaction is paramount. Commitment to team
goals is important when task interdependency is high rather than
low (Aubé & Rousseau, 2005), and this also suggests that teams
composed of members with high Goal Priority would display
higher levels of team performance during the latest stages of
development.
Hypothesis 5: Average team-member Goal Priority is positively related to end-state team performance.

Longitudinal Team Performance
Collectivism is thought to promote team performance because team members are motivated to cooperate with one another (e.g., Triandis, 1989; Wagner, 1995). Although the facets
of collectivism reflect a strong motivational component to
cooperate in general, the degree to which this motivation to
cooperate enhances team performance over time is likely a
function of the quality of cooperation among team members.
That is, the extent to which highly collectivistic teams outperform other teams is likely moderated by the quality of the
cooperation among those teams’ members. Further, because the
facets of psychological collectivism are thought to promote
cooperation in teams for different reasons (Jackson et al., 2006),
we expect the extent to which cooperation quality moderates
relationships between psychological collectivism and team performance to vary as a function of the facets.
One way to conceptualize how teams differ in terms of the
quality of cooperation between team members is to examine the
perceptions of individuals regarding the quality of social interactions among team members. Team-member exchange (TMX)
has been put forth as a member’s perception of the quality of
interpersonal exchanges (Seers, 1989). TMX measures team
member self-perception of the willingness to help others, to
share ideas and feedback with other team members, and team
member perception of how readily help, information, and recognition are received from others. Individuals can and do aggregate their perceptions of social exchanges across members of
the work team (Seers, Petty, & Cashman, 1995). Thus, when
individuals within a team perceive there to be a high-quality
exchange, they view both themselves and other team members
as engaging in reciprocal cooperative behaviors. As Seers et al.
(1995) noted, “Individual-level analysis [of TMX] involves the
individual employee’s perception of his or her reciprocity with
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other team members. When these data are aggregated to the
group level, we are dealing with the average reciprocity across
the group” (p. 23). In this sense, teams display meaningful (and
systematic) variation with regard to the average level of TMX
perceived by their members (Seers, 1989; Seers et al., 1995). It
is this between-team variation in TMX that, we argue, will
amplify or attenuate the effects of psychological collectivism
on team performance. Although TMX is likely associated with
ultimate team performance, the moderating effects of TMX are
likely to be most noticeable when one examines team performance changes over time (i.e., differences in performance trajectories).
Psychological collectivism facets that are related to initial
performance (e.g., Preference, Concern, Reliance) may interact
with the perceived quality of cooperation as teams continue to
function together. In particular, Preference and Concern (facets
that reflect affiliation) may amplify performance benefits over
time for teams if team members perceive there to be a higher
quality TMX. If expectations are unclear, feedback is lacking,
and helping is not perceived to be present in the team (characteristics of a low TMX), the motivation of team members high
on Preference and Concern to engage in cooperative behaviors
with other members of that particular team may diminish as the
exchange component is repeatedly frustrated. Although there is
a general attraction toward working in teams for individuals
high on Preference and Concern, whether or not the team
members adopt the new team as an in-group is a function of the
quality of the reciprocal exchange between team members
(Seers et al., 1995). Thus, if team members high on Preference
and Concern perceive low quality of cooperation, they may not
adopt the new team as an in-group, resulting in limited longterm performance benefit for teams composed of highPreference and high-Concern individuals. This expected moderation is congruent to related research on collectivism in
general that has shown that collectivists more readily draw
distinctions between in-groups and out-groups, resulting in
more engagement in cooperative behaviors with members of
their in-group and less with members of out-groups (Gómez,
Kirkman, & Shapiro, 2000; Triandis, 1995; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). Thus, the extent to
which teams comprising individuals high on Preference or
Concern continue to experience increases in performance beyond early performance should be moderated by whether or not
team members generally perceive there to be high-quality cooperation within the team.
Hypothesis 6: TMX and average team-member Preference
interact to predict performance change such that there is a
stronger relationship for teams with high TMX.
Hypothesis 7: TMX and average team-member Concern interact to predict performance change such that there is a
stronger relationship for teams with high TMX.
Team members high on the Reliance facet of psychological
collectivism believe that one team member’s responsibility is the
responsibility of the entire group. Although teams composed of
members low in Reliance may have better initial team performance, once a team has come to an understanding of team mem-
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bers’ roles and created its interpersonal interaction norms, a willingness to rely on other team members should benefit team
performance. This positive relationship between reliance and team
performance over time, however, is likely to be contingent upon
the quality of the cooperation between team members. Highquality TMX relationships are characterized by willingness for
team members to help one another and share ideas, information,
and feedback (Seers et al., 1995). A high-quality exchange relationship should provide a context in which team members high on
reliance feel comfortable continuing to rely on other members and
approaching the interdependent task as a shared responsibility,
ultimately resulting in more effective team performance. Teams
composed of high-reliance individuals prefer to approach the task
with a shared responsibility; yet, if team members perceive there to
be a low-quality reciprocal exchange between team members, team
members may become frustrated and performance would decrease
over time.
Hypothesis 8: TMX and average team-member reliance interact to predict performance change such that there is a
negative relationship for teams with low TMX and a positive
relationship for teams with high TMX.
Whether compliance with team norms promotes effective
team performance over time is also contingent upon team
members’ perceptions that there is a quality interaction between
team members. For instance, in order for Norm Acceptance to
benefit team performance, teams require norms that facilitate
assistance, feedback, and open communication among team
members—the hallmarks of high-quality TMX. If team norms
reflect an unwillingness to help other team members or share
information, compliance with these uncooperative norms may
be detrimental to team performance. Although overall levels of
Norm Acceptance in teams are likely related to performance as
it unfolds over time, we expected this relationship would be
moderated by TMX.
Hypothesis 9: TMX and average team-member Norm Acceptance interact to predict performance change such that there is
a positive relationship for teams with high TMX and a negative relationship for teams with low TMX.
As teams continue to function over time, competing priorities
and divided attention may reduce the effort team members
apply to the team task. For example, effective team performance requires individuals to place the team goals above their
individual goals. Goal Priority has been shown to be associated
with increased task performance and decreased withdrawal behavior among individual team members, as the prioritization of
team goals is thought to foster an intense and long-lasting
exertion of effort (Jackson et al., 2006). Thus, teams composed
of individuals high on Goal Priority are likely to reap greater
performance benefits than those composed of individuals low
on this facet. However, this positive relationship is also likely
to be amplified by the extent to which team members perceive
there to be a quality exchange among the team. That is, members are unlikely to continually apply effort toward the team
goals unless team members perceive that a high-quality exchange exists between the team members and that their collec-
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tive efforts are not futile. In this sense, the degree to which
prioritizing the team’s goals over individuals’ goals promotes
team performance is likely moderated by whether or not the
members of a team perceive reciprocity in their efforts toward
the team’s task (i.e., high TMX).
Hypothesis 10: TMX and average team-member Goal Priority
interact to predict performance change such that there is a
stronger positive relationship for teams with high TMX.

Method
Participants and Setting
Participants (N ⫽ 264) were undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in a capstone business course at a large midwestern
university. These participants were members of a total of 66 teams,
with 3– 6 individuals on each team (M ⫽ 4.12). To reflect a
realistic organizational context, all of the teams had a multifunctional composition consisting of at least three different business
majors or concentrations (e.g., accounting, marketing, management). Average age of the undergraduate participants was 23.4
years (58% male). Average age of the graduate participants was
30.0 years (77% male).
A major focus of the course was on a business simulation
(Capstone Business Simulation; D. Smith, 2008) in which participants had to make complex sets of decisions as a team involving
all aspects of a business’s operation. Teams competed in a realtime, interactive decision-making environment against other teams
in the same course. Team performance on the simulation accounted for a significant portion of the participants’ grades (24%
of total grade), thus ensuring sufficient effort and motivation. The
simulation software is designed to mimic a dynamic marketplace
that reflects changing technology, customer values, and competitive pressures. Participant roles on the teams were similar to those
of upper level management in a manufacturing organization.
Teams had to make operating decisions that involved a variety of
issues (e.g., research and development, marketing, production,
human resources, total quality management, finance). All teams
began with equal amounts of resources and equal market positions,
so no team was at a disadvantage at the start of the simulation.
Teams had to develop their own budgets and allocate finite resources on the basis of competitive relationships. No teams were
allowed to go bankrupt and prematurely exit the simulation. Teams
running a cash deficit were automatically given an emergency
loan, which included a penalty.
Prior to the start of the simulation, participants were given a
36-page guide and access to an online tutorial and an online
practice simulation. Teams made operating decisions twice weekly
with the exception of the first two decisions, which were done once
a week to familiarize the participants with the simulation. Each
decision cycle corresponded to a 1-year time frame in the simulation. Teams performed the simulation for 8 simulated years over
a 5-week period. Psychological collectivism was measured after a
practice decision. TMX was collected after the second, fourth, and
sixth team decisions and a week prior to the eighth team decision.
To ensure temporal precedence of the moderator, we assessed
team-level performance immediately after the third, fifth, seventh,
and eighth decisions.

Measures
Psychological collectivism. We measured psychological collectivism using the five-facet instrument by Jackson et al. (2006).
This scale consists of 15 total items, with each facet assessed by
three items on a 5-point scale (1 ⫽ strongly disagree to 5 ⫽
strongly agree). Each item began with the prompt “Think about
groups (work or class) to which you currently belong and/or have
belonged to in the past.” Sample items included “I preferred to
work in those groups rather than working alone” (Preference
facet); “I was not bothered by the need to rely on group members”
(Reliance facet); “I was concerned about the needs of those
groups” (Concern facet); “I followed the norms of those groups”
(Norm Acceptance facet); and, “Group goals were more important
to me than my personal goals” (Goal Priority facet). Coefficient
alphas were .90 for Preference, .86 for Reliance, .84 for Concern,
.80 for Norm Acceptance, and .90 for Goal Priority.
Because our hypotheses centered on the relation of elevated
levels of psychological collectivism to team performance, we used
the average level of psychological collectivism to describe the
level of psychological collectivism within a team. When operationalized as the team mean, team composition variables have
shown consistently stronger relationships with team performance
than when operationalized as other descriptive properties, such as
variability (Bell, 2007). However, we also included the level of
variability within the team as a potential covariate. Two teams may
have identical average levels of psychological collectivism but
have different levels of variability. For example, Team 1 may be
composed of members with the same score for psychological
collectivism, and Team 2 may be composed of members with high
and low scores that average to the same level of psychological
collectivism as in Team 1. Thus, to allow for a more comprehensive examination of the relationships between average team psychological collectivism and team performance, we controlled for
team variability.
Team cooperation quality. This variable was assessed with
the TMX scale developed by Seers (1989). This 14-item scale
captures the quality and reciprocity of relationships among team
members, as well as perceptions of the willingness of team members to share information and assist one another. Items were rated
with a 5-point scale (1 ⫽ strongly disagree to 5 ⫽ strongly agree).
Sample items included “Other group members usually let me know
what they expected from me,” “I often made suggestions to other
group members about better work methods,” “When I was busy,
other group members volunteered to help me out,” and “I was
willing to help finish work that had been given to other group
members.” Scores were averaged across team members to produce
a team-level variable. Evidence for aggregation was supportive for
each time point: Time 1, intraclass correlation [ICC] (1) ⫽ .35,
ICC(2) ⫽ .73, F(65, 264) ⫽ 3.74, p ⬍ .01, 2 ⫽ .56; Time 2,
ICC(1) ⫽ .33, ICC(2) ⫽ .71, F(65, 264) ⫽ 3.49, p ⬍ .01, 2 ⫽
.54; Time 3, ICC(1) ⫽ .34, ICC(2) ⫽ .72, F(65, 264) ⫽ 3.58, p ⬍
.01, 2 ⫽ .55; Time 4, ICC(1) ⫽ .39, ICC(2) ⫽ .76, F(65, 264) ⫽
4.22, p ⬍ .01, 2 ⫽ .59.
Team-level performance. Performance was operationalized
with metrics automatically generated by the simulation. These data
correspond to various financial indicators of business effectiveness
typically used in real-world organizations: return on assets, return
on sales, and stock value. The simulation computes these perfor-
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mance indicators by taking into account the decisions of each
“company” relative to the simulated marketplace as a whole. In
each of these measures, the level of performance of a company is
viewed relative to different aspects of its operation. Return on
assets measures how effectively a company is using assets to reach
its level of performance. Return on sales, sometimes referred to as
operating profit margin, assesses a company’s level of performance relative to the amount of sales that are generated. Stock
value represents how effectively debt and equity are being used to
create a firm’s level of performance. As Helfert (2001) observed
about these and other financial indicators, “They serve best when
used in selected combinations to point out changes in financial
conditions or operating performance over several periods and as
compared to similar businesses” (p. 96). Thus, a composite measure was created with these three metrics. Variables were standardized prior to creation of the composite score. Coefficient alpha
for scores on the composite measure was .94.
Education level. Study participants were enrolled in an undergraduate or a graduate version of the course; thus, teams were
homogenous in composition (i.e., either all graduate students or all
undergraduate students). We controlled for this educational difference between teams using a dichotomously coded variable (0 ⫽
undergraduate, 1 ⫽ graduate).

Analytical Strategy
We tested Hypotheses 1–10 using multilevel growth modeling
to simultaneously analyze intrateam change and interteam differences in performance change trajectories, initial performance, and
end-state performance. All analyses were conducted with HLM 6
(Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2004) and followed a
staged approach (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). First, an unconditional means model was conducted to test for significant differences between teams in performance. Second, two unconditional
growth models (linear change was the only predictor) were conducted to test for significant differences in performance change
trajectories (slopes) across teams, as well as to establish baseline
estimates of initial and end-state performance (intercepts). One
model coded the time series as 0, 1, 2, and 3 to reflect initial team
performance. An additional model coded the time series as ⫺3,
⫺2, ⫺1, and 0, so the intercept would reflect end-state team
performance. Third, two conditional change models were conducted to test hypotheses regarding team-level predictors of initial
team performance and end-state team performance (intercepts), as
well as performance trajectories (slopes). Fourth, a final conditional change model was conducted in which team TMX scores
from each time point were modeled as “time-varying covariates.”
This is appropriate when both the covariate and the criterion vary
over time. This time-varying covariate was group mean centered to
avoid bias that occurs when the aggregate of the covariate has a
separate but distinct relationship with the intercept (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Because group mean centering does not
account for main effects of Level 1 variables when assessing main
effects of Level 2 predictors or cross-level interaction effects
(Hofmann & Gavin, 1998), we reintroduced between-group variance into this model by including the mean of TMX for each
team as a Level 2 predictor. This model’s results show longitudinal relationships between team-level performance and TMX
and test for longitudinal interactions between facets of psycho-
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logical collectivism and TMX. To reiterate, team performance
was measured subsequent to TMX, thus creating temporal precedence.

Results
Table 1 displays the means, standard deviations, and correlations for study variables. The majority of correlations (75%) between team mean psychological collectivism facets and each of the
four team performance measurements were significant ( p ⬍ .05).
Only Reliance did not display significant team-level correlations
with performance. A majority of correlations (63%) between the
team mean psychological collectivism facets and the four TMX
assessments were significant ( p ⬍ .05) as well. For team variability on psychological collectivism, only Concern and Goal Priority
variability were related to team performance. Team variability on
the facets was unrelated to TMX.
The first stage of our analyses examined an unconditional means
model (null model) that partitioned variance in team performance
into within- and between-teams components. Results indicated
significant between-teams variance in performance (00 ⫽ 92.45,
df ⫽ 65, 2 ⫽ 123.95, p ⬍ .01) and showed that 19% of total
variation in performance resided between teams. The second stage
posited two unconditional change models to test for significant
differences between teams in initial performance and end-state
performance (intercepts), as well as performance change trajectories (slopes). Results from these models indicated significant
between-teams differences in initial team performance (00 ⫽
19.54, df ⫽ 65, 2 ⫽ 84.77, p ⬍ .05) and end-state team performance (00 ⫽ 474.83, df ⫽ 65, 2 ⫽ 507.81, p ⬍ .01). Differences
in team performance change over time were evident, as the variance component for growth trajectories was significant (01 ⫽
33.59, df ⫽ 65, 2 ⫽ 155.90, p ⬍ .01). Results also indicated that
76% of within-team performance variation was associated with
linear change.
The third stage of analyses posited conditional change models to
test whether particular psychological collectivism facets predicted
initial team performance (Hypotheses 1–3) and end-state team
performance (Hypotheses 4 –5). The intercept results from these
“intercepts-as-outcomes” models are shown in Table 2. Time,
education level, and team variances of each psychological collectivism facet were included in these models as controls. Results
from the first model that coded the intercept to represent initial
team performance as the criterion indicated that psychological
collectivism explained 71% of the between-teams variance in
initial team performance (approximately 13% of total variation in
team performance). Without the controls for psychological collectivism variability, psychological collectivism still explained 60%
of the between-teams variance in initial team performance (approximately 11% of total variation in team performance). Results
from the second model that coded the intercept to represent endstate team performance as the criterion showed that psychological
collectivism explained 53% of the between-teams variation in
end-state team performance (10% of total variation). Without the
controls for psychological collectivism variability, psychological
collectivism still explained 38% of the between-teams variation in
end-state team performance (7% of total variation).
Hypothesis 1 predicted that Preference would be positively
related to initial team performance. Results in the top half of Table

Preference (m)
Preference (v)
Concern (m)
Concern (v)
Reliance (m)
Reliance (v)
Norm Acceptance (m)
Norm Acceptance (v)
Goal Priority (m)
Goal Priority (v)
Education level
TMX, Time 1
TMX, Time 2
TMX, Time 3
TMX, Time 4
Performance, Time 1
Performance, Time 2
Performance, Time 3
Performance, Time 4

3.42
0.78
3.88
0.58
3.36
0.73
3.94
0.43
3.38
0.83
0.41
3.83
3.85
3.93
4.09
14.38
17.25
27.79
51.87

M
0.58
0.31
0.40
0.25
0.42
0.27
0.28
0.22
0.48
0.32
0.50
0.31
0.32
0.35
0.33
7.74
12.68
18.04
24.27

SD
—
⫺.03
.35
⫺.13
.43
.20
.22
.11
.47
.01
.07
.22
.26
.22
.27
.32
.43
.40
.32

1
—
⫺.17
.11
⫺.20
.31
⫺.16
.14
.05
.34
⫺.18
⫺.10
⫺.06
⫺.02
⫺.22
.02
⫺.17
⫺.04
⫺.05

2

—
⫺.29
.14
.11
.19
.12
.38
⫺.01
⫺.08
.32
.38
.39
.28
.38
.33
.34
.33

3

—
.01
.07
⫺.17
.43
⫺.32
.11
⫺.19
⫺.07
.13
.09
.01
⫺.39
⫺.34
⫺.31
⫺.43

4

—
⫺.31
.18
.10
.11
⫺.11
.38
.28
.33
.29
.22
⫺.09
.17
.11
.17

5

—
.14
.09
.05
.28
⫺.46
⫺.14
.01
⫺.06
.04
⫺.01
⫺.10
.04
⫺.15

6

—
⫺.15
.30
⫺.10
.03
.14
.14
.22
.40
.08
.26
.26
.23

7

—
⫺.08
.30
⫺.21
.13
.07
.03
⫺.01
⫺.10
⫺.07
⫺.09
⫺.11

8

—
.03
.15
.32
.24
.29
.42
.41
.41
.59
.50

9

—
⫺.17
⫺.12
.02
⫺.01
.02
⫺.26
⫺.25
⫺.21
⫺.35

10

—
.26
.08
.18
.17
.08
.30
.26
.28

11

—
.58
.54
.41
.21
.35
.36
.35

12

—
.84
.47
.17
.32
.30
.18

13

—
.53
.04
.26
.30
.23

14

—
.13
.32
.40
.34

15

—
.66
.63
.65

16

—
.67
.63

17

—
.84

18

Note. N ⫽ 66 teams. Teams were homogenous in terms of education level. Team educational level was dummy coded as 0 ⫽ undergraduate, 1 ⫽ graduate. Correlations greater than .31 significant
at p ⬍ .01, greater than .24 significant at p ⬍ .05. m ⫽ mean; v ⫽ variance; TMX ⫽ team-member exchange.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Variable

Table 1
Correlations Between Study Variables
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Table 2
Psychological Collectivism Predicting Initial and Final
Team Performance
Fixed effect

Coefficient

Initial team performance
Intercept (performance), ␤0
Intercept, ␥00
⫺5.88
Education level, ␥01
2.43
Preference (m), ␥02
5.28ⴱⴱ
Preference (v), ␥03
0.25
Concern (m), ␥04
3.80ⴱ
Concern (v), ␥05
⫺4.06
Reliance (m), ␥06
⫺5.65ⴱⴱ
Reliance (v), ␥07
⫺1.28
Norm Acceptance (m), ␥08
0.31
Norm Acceptance (v), ␥09
1.72
Goal Priority (m), ␥010
1.49
Goal Priority (v), ␥011
⫺4.24
End-state team performance
Intercept (performance), ␤0
Intercept, ␥00
⫺50.49ⴱⴱ
Education level, ␥01
9.67ⴱⴱ
Preference (m), ␥02
5.13
Preference (v), ␥03
8.34
Concern (m), ␥04
6.84
Concern (v), ␥05
⫺21.02ⴱⴱ
Reliance (m), ␥06
⫺3.91
Reliance (v), ␥07
⫺3.05
Norm Acceptance (m), ␥08
7.16
Norm Acceptance (v), ␥09
15.93
Goal Priority (m), ␥010
16.25ⴱⴱ
Goal Priority (v), ␥011
⫺24.67ⴱⴱ

SE

t ratio

13.79
1.83
1.79
2.43
2.19
3.84
2.15
3.55
2.84
4.05
2.14
3.89

⫺0.426
1.324
2.946
0.015
1.737
⫺1.059
⫺2.632
⫺0.360
0.109
0.426
0.695
⫺1.464

23.00
4.39
3.89
6.84
5.92
9.40
5.42
8.44
8.98
10.51
3.76
6.58

⫺2.195
2.202
1.317
1.219
1.155
⫺2.236
⫺0.723
⫺0.362
0.798
1.516
4.323
⫺3.751

Note. Estimates for initial and end-state performance are from separate
hierarchical linear models. m ⫽ mean; v ⫽ variance; SE ⫽ robust standard
error.
ⴱ
p ⱕ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⱕ .01 (one-tailed).

2 support this hypothesis, as teams higher on the Preference facet
performed better at the initial time point (␥02 ⫽ 5.28, p ⬍ .01).
Similarly, Hypothesis 2 predicted that Concern would be positively related to initial team performance. Results in Table 2
support this hypothesis, as teams higher on the Concern facet
performed better at the initial time point (␥04 ⫽ 3.80, p ⬍ .05).
Finally, Hypothesis 3 predicted Reliance would be negatively
related to initial team performance. This hypothesis was supported,
as teams higher on the Reliance facet showed lower initial team
performance (␥06 ⫽ ⫺5.65, p ⬍ .01).
Hypothesis 4 predicted that Norm Acceptance would be positively associated with end-state team performance. Results shown
in the bottom half of Table 2 failed to support this hypothesis, as
the Norm Acceptance facet was not significantly related to endstate performance. Hypothesis 5 predicted that Goal Priority would
be positively related to end-state team performance. Findings
support this conjecture, with teams higher on the Goal Priority
facet displaying higher end-state performance (␥010 ⫽ 16.25, p ⬍
.01). Although this was not hypothesized, teams with higher variability on the Concern facet and the Goal Priority facet displayed
lower end-state team performance (␥05 ⫽ ⫺21.02, p ⬍ .01 and
␥011 ⫽ ⫺24.67, p ⬍ .01, respectively).
The fourth and final stage of analysis examined a conditional
change model in which team TMX scores were modeled as time-
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varying covariates in order to test for longitudinal interactions
between facets of psychological collectivism and TMX (Hypotheses 6 –10). Results from this model are shown in Table 3. Mean
levels of Reliance and Goal Priority displayed positive main effects accounting for team performance change over time (␥15 ⫽
2.83, p ⬍ .05 and ␥111 ⫽ 5.69, p ⬍ .01, respectively). Variability
in Concern and Goal Priority showed negative main effects for
team performance change over time (␥18 ⫽ ⫺6.83, p ⬍ .01 and
␥112 ⫽ 4.46, p ⬍ .05, respectively). Results also indicated significant between-teams differences in performance change trajectories (01 ⫽ 15.58, df ⫽ 53, 2 ⫽ 87.26, p ⬍ .01) and changes in
Table 3
Psychological Collectivism, Team-Member Exchange, and
Performance Change
Fixed effect

Coefficient

Intercept (end-state performance),
Intercept, ␥00
⫺71.01ⴱ
Education level, ␥01
8.23
TMX mean, ␥02
18.38ⴱ
Preference (m), ␥03
3.55
Preference (v), ␥04
9.98
Reliance (m), ␥05
⫺1.86
Reliance (v), ␥06
0.98
Concern (m), ␥07
0.43
Concern (v), ␥08
⫺26.68ⴱⴱ
Norm Acceptance (m), ␥09
⫺0.59
Norm Acceptance (v), ␥010
14.67
Goal Priority (m), ␥011
15.70ⴱⴱ
Goal Priority (v), ␥012
⫺21.29ⴱⴱ

SE

t ratio

␤0
42.35
5.60
10.79
5.25
7.93
7.14
10.88
7.53
11.72
8.85
12.78
6.39
8.07

⫺1.677
1.471
1.704
0.677
1.258
⫺0.260
0.090
0.057
⫺2.277
⫺0.067
1.148
2.458
⫺2.639

Intercept, ␥10
Education level, ␥11
TMX mean, ␥12
Preference (m), ␥13
Preference (v), ␥14
Reliance (m), ␥15
Reliance (v), ␥16
Concern (m), ␥17
Concern (v), ␥18
Norm Acceptance (m), ␥19
Norm Acceptance (v), ␥110
Goal Priority (m), ␥111
Goal Priority (v), ␥112

Time, ␤1
⫺18.47ⴱ
2.22
4.76
⫺1.25
3.68
2.83ⴱ
2.24
⫺1.31
⫺6.83ⴱ
⫺1.92
3.38
5.69ⴱⴱ
⫺4.46ⴱ

11.10
2.19
4.34
2.06
3.00
1.70
4.28
3.09
3.74
3.50
5.20
2.70
2.41

⫺1.663
1.013
1.096
⫺0.604
1.227
1.664
0.523
⫺0.423
⫺1.826
⫺0.550
0.651
2.104
⫺1.853

Intercept, ␥20
Education level, ␥21
TMX mean, ␥22
Preference (m), ␥23
Preference (v), ␥24
Reliance (m), ␥25
Reliance (v), ␥26
Concern (m), ␥27
Concern (v), ␥28
Norm Acceptance (m), ␥29
Norm Acceptance (v), ␥210
Goal Priority (m), ␥211
Goal Priority (v), ␥212

TMX, ␤2
52.37ⴱ
2.24
4.19
15.56ⴱⴱ
⫺4.56
⫺28.39ⴱⴱ
⫺20.24
10.00
⫺25.21
18.77ⴱ
7.93
⫺18.36
⫺34.02ⴱⴱ

30.82
12.11
26.45
7.65
13.63
12.84
21.37
17.08
25.53
11.03
30.43
15.24
16.20

1.699
0.185
0.158
2.035
0.335
2.210
0.947
0.586
0.987
1.702
0.260
1.204
2.100

Note. TMX mean does not describe a meaningful property of the Level
2 units and is included for statistical reasons. SE ⫽ robust standard error;
m ⫽ mean; v ⫽ variance; TMX ⫽ team-member exchange.
ⴱ
p ⱕ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⱕ .01 (one-tailed).
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TMX over time (03 ⫽ 66.56, df ⫽ 53, 2 ⫽ 77.74, p ⬍ .05). TMX
alone accounted for approximately 6% of within-team differences
in performance change. Modeling the influences of psychological
collectivism and TMX explained 55% of the between-teams variation in end-state performance (approximately 10% of total variation in team performance), as well as an additional 11% of
end-state performance variation beyond that explained in the
model without TMX. Without the controls for psychological collectivism variability, modeling psychological collectivism and
TMX still explained 43% of the between-teams variation in endstate performance (8% of total variation in team performance). In
relation to variation in performance change trajectories, modeling
psychological collectivism and TMX explained 53% of the
between-teams differences in performance change and an additional 20% beyond the model without TMX. Without controlling
for psychological collectivism variability, modeling psychological
collectivism and TMX still explained 46% of the between-teams
differences in performance change and 6% beyond the model
without TMX.
Hypothesis 6 predicted a longitudinal interaction between TMX
and Preference in which the relationship would be stronger for
teams with high TMX. Results in Table 3 show a significant
parameter (␥23 ⫽ 15.56, p ⬍ .01) for this interaction. The form of
this interaction is shown in Figure 1 and indicates that teams with
a high Preference facet and high-quality TMX displayed amplified
performance change over time (i.e., steeper slope). These results
support Hypothesis 6.
Hypothesis 7 posited a longitudinal interaction between TMX
and Concern such that a stronger relationship would be found for
teams with high TMX. From Table 3, the interaction parameter
was not significant (␥27 ⫽ 10.00, p ⬎ .05). Thus, our findings
failed to support Hypothesis 7.
Hypothesis 8 predicted a longitudinal interaction between TMX
and Reliance such that a negative relationship for teams with low
TMX and a positive relationship for teams with high TMX would

be found. Our results showed a significant parameter (␥25 ⫽
⫺28.39, p ⬍ .01) for the interaction between TMX and Reliance.
The nature of this interaction is depicted in Figure 2. For teams low
on the Reliance facet, contrary to our hypothesis, higher levels of
TMX were associated with higher performance change. However,
for teams high on the Reliance facet, higher levels of TMX were
not associated with higher performance change. Overall, these
findings failed to support Hypothesis 8.
The longitudinal interaction described in Hypothesis 9 predicted
that TMX would moderate the relationship between Norm Acceptance and performance change by having a positive relationship for
teams with high TMX and a negative relationship for teams with
low TMX. The parameter for this interaction was significant
(␥29 ⫽ 18.77, p ⬍ .05). The plot of this interaction, shown in
Figure 3, indicates that teams high on the Norm Acceptance facet
and having high-quality TMX show positive performance change,
whereas teams having low-quality TMX show negative performance change. These results provided support for Hypothesis 9.
Finally, Hypothesis 10 predicted that TMX and Goal Priority
would interact to predict performance change such that the relationship for teams with high-quality TMX would be amplified.
Results failed to support this hypothesis, as the interaction parameter was not significant ( p ⬎ .05). Although not hypothesized,
there was a significant interaction between TMX and Goal Priority
variability (␥211 ⫽ ⫺34.02, p ⬍ .01).

Discussion
In a recent comprehensive meta-analytic review of deep-level
team composition variables, Bell (2007) observed a medium effect
for the relationship between team collectivism and team performance. Despite the size of the effect, only a limited amount of
variance could be attributed to artifacts suggesting the presence of
moderators. Our main objective in this research was to investigate
the relationship between psychological collectivism and team per-

36.45

Low TMX

Team Performance Change

High TMX

32.99

29.53

26.07

22.61
2.50

2.90

3.29

3.69

4.08

Preference
Figure 1. Moderating effects of team-member exchange (TMX) on Preference and team performance change.
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36.71

Low TMX

Team Performance Change

High TMX

33.41

30.11

26.82

23.52
2.72

3.01

3.31

3.60

3.89

Reliance
Figure 2.

Moderating effects of team-member exchange (TMX) on Reliance and team performance change.

formance with specific consideration of the different facets of
psychological collectivism, the role of time in the psychological
collectivism and team performance relationships, and the extent to
which cooperation quality moderates those relationships as performance changes over time.
First, in order to gain a more nuanced understanding of the
collectivism and team performance relationship, we used Jackson
et al.’s (2006) recent measure of psychological collectivism to
examine collectivism at the facet level. Our results suggest that
relationships between collectivism and team performance vary as
a function of the specific facets of psychological collectivism
forwarded by Jackson et al. (Preference, Concern, Reliance, Norm

Acceptance, and Goal Priority). The size of the bivariate relationships between team performance and Preference, Concern, and
Goal Priority surpassed medium effects and thus supported the use
of mean levels of psychological collectivism facets as predictors of
team performance.
Second, we applied a “temporal lens” to the study of psychological collectivism and team performance (Ancona, Goodman,
Lawrence, & Tushman, 2001) and examined performance at three
stages: initial team performance, end-state performance, and performance change over time. We used Kozlowski et al.’s (1999)
theory of team compilation and performance as a conceptual
backdrop for our temporal hypotheses. The relative importance of

32.93

Low TMX

Team Performance Change

High TMX

30.89

28.86

26.82

24.79
3.61

3.77

3.93

4.09

4.25

Norm Acceptance
Figure 3. Moderating effects of team-member exchange (TMX) on Norm Acceptance and team performance
change.
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the psychological collectivism facets in terms of predicting performance varied over time. For example, our results indicate that
facets of collectivism associated with affiliation (i.e., Preference
and Concern) are important for initial team performance, whereas
Goal Priority is important for end-state performance. These results
are consistent with those of studies calling for research to examine
work team relationships within the context of time (e.g., Mohammed et al., 2008).
Finally, we examined TMX as a moderator and found that the
perceived quality of cooperation within teams significantly shapes
the relationships between three of the five facets of psychological
collectivism and team performance as it unfolds over time. Overall, these moderation findings indicate the importance of cooperation quality as an influential contextual factor that can amplify or
attenuate the effects of some facets of psychological collectivism.
We next discuss our specific findings and organize this discussion
by the specific facets of psychological collectivism.

Preference and Concern
Although all facets of psychological collectivism are thought to
affect cooperation between team members and ultimately performance (Jackson et al., 2006), our results show that facets related to
the extent that team members affiliate with the team (i.e., Preference and Concern) are positively related to initial team performance. Subsequent to initial team performance, teams that are high
on the Preference facet and display high-quality TMX also reap
greater longitudinal performance gains. This finding suggests that
although high Preference positively influences early performance
and performance change, higher quality of cooperation among
team members serves to amplify the performance gains over time.
This amplification may exist because perceptions of a high-quality
exchange signal the team members high on Preference to view the
particular team as an in-group, and the cooperative behaviors
expected from high-Preference team members might then follow.
Our results also show that TMX fails to yield the same moderating
effects for the relationship between Concern, the other affiliative
facet of psychological collectivism, and performance change. Although not hypothesized, a main effect for variability on teammember Concern and performance change was observed such that
teams with increased variability had decreased end-state performance and weaker team performance change trajectories. Taken
together, our results suggest different dynamics for how teammember Preference and Concern relate to performance over time.
High-Preference team members may look to the quality of cooperation to determine whether they will continue with their cooperative efforts thought to enhance performance. On the other hand,
it may be important for team members to perceive that the level of
Concern they have for the team and other team members is
reciprocated. Although not measured in the current study, cues
from team affect (George, 1990) or emotions (Barsade, 2002),
rather than the perceived quality of cooperation, may play a role in
the relationship between Concern and performance.

Reliance
As hypothesized, Reliance was negatively related to initial team
performance. This result suggests that teams benefit from members
being skeptical of the extent that they can rely on other team

members during team formation. Reliance also interacts with TMX
to provide benefits to longitudinal team performance. However,
the interaction was incongruent with our hypothesis that predicted
a negative relationship between Reliance and performance change
for teams with low-quality TMX and a positive relationship between Reliance and performance change for teams with highquality TMX. Instead, the performance benefits of high-quality
TMX appear most salient for teams with members low on Reliance
and least salient for teams with members high on Reliance. To
further understand and facilitate interpretation of this unexpected
finding, we examined an alternative interaction plot in which
teams were split based on Reliance scores. This plot similarly
indicates that the positive benefit of high TMX seems to manifest
only for teams low on the Reliance facet. These results suggest that
in teams composed of individuals who feel uncomfortable relying
on and trusting in other team members, the quality of cooperation
among team members is especially critical for effective performance over time.
One possible explanation for these results is that team members
low on Reliance may be more sensitive to the presence of a
“sucker effect.” The sucker effect is the notion that if an individual
has a teammate who appears to be free riding on the team’s effort,
the individual will reduce his or her efforts rather than play the role
of the sucker (Kerr, 1983). Teams composed of low-Reliance
members may more closely monitor the quality of the exchange
relationship as captured by TMX. For example, individuals with
higher perceptions of TMX are more likely to contribute to collective capital (i.e., dense networks of information sharing, trust,
and norms of reciprocation that facilitate a collective action; see
M. L. Smith, 1995). TMX is also related to helping behaviors
(Kamdar & Van Dyne, 2007). Thus, if a high-quality exchange is
perceived within a team, low-Reliance members may be willing to
continue their collective efforts. A low-quality exchange may feed
into discomfort low-Reliance team members have about relying on
and trusting in other team members and may diminish their motivation to contribute to the team task.
Another explanation is that teams composed of members low on
Reliance may engage in more team monitoring and backup behaviors (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001). If an individual does not
feel comfortable relying on other team members, this may motivate the individual to ensure that other team members are executing their assigned tasks, allowing the individual opportunities to
provide backup behaviors when needed. Backing up team members with a heavy share of the workload has been shown to
increase team performance (Porter et al., 2003); however, there
seem to be limits to the benefits of backing up behaviors (Barnes
et al., 2008). For example, backing up behavior may have negative
long-term consequences if teams have evenly distributed workloads or if recipients become dependent on the backup behaviors.
This dynamic offers another potential explanation why high TMX
is particularly important for team composed of low-Reliance members. Low-Reliance members may be more likely to monitor other
team members, which allows them to offer backup behaviors when
appropriate, but these behaviors will lead to performance gain over
time only in the context of high-quality cooperation.
In sum, the Reliance and TMX interaction predicting performance change over time is particularly interesting in combination
with the negative relationship between Reliance and initial team
performance. It could be that low levels of Reliance ensure the
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individual effort needed at the early phases of team development
(e.g., team formation) and that as long as a high-quality reciprocal
exchange continues as the team develops, team performance will
be highest when members are low on Reliance.

Goal Priority
For end-state performance, teams whose members tended to
prioritize team goals were found to have more effective performance than teams whose members did not. In other words, although having a natural affinity for other team members and sense
of attraction to the team is particularly helpful when the team
begins (i.e., Preference and Concern), an overall sense of interdependence through valuing team goals (i.e., Goal Priority) is important for ultimate performance. Although not hypothesized, variability in Goal Priority displayed inverse main effects with
end-state performance and performance change. These results suggests that, as do low mean levels, heterogeneity in the extent to
which individuals place team goals over personal goals has deleterious effects on team performance. Variability in Goal Priority
also displayed significant interactive effects with TMX on team
performance. The form of this interaction shows that teams with
high TMX, more than with low TMX, experienced the deleterious
effects of high Goal Priority variability. This suggests that although team members may perceive high-quality exchange relationships, team performance will suffer if they hold different value
Preferences for team versus personal goals. We believe that Goal
Priority is particularly important for continuing organizational
teams. That is, the demands of the team compete with members’
other job demands, but valuing the team’s goals may be the basis
for the continued motivation members need to consistently apply
effort toward the team’s task. Examining psychological collectivism and performance over time helped reveal this result.

Norm Acceptance
Contrary to our prediction, Norm Acceptance did not have a
linear relationship with end-state performance. However, our results showed that TMX moderates the relationship between Norm
Acceptance and team performance over time. As we hypothesized,
teams with high Norm Acceptance and high TMX reaped positive
performance gains, whereas teams with low TMX experienced
performance degradation over time. These findings suggest that
the quality of interpersonal interactions is critical to promoting and
maintaining the positive effects of Norm Acceptance on team
performance. One reason for this moderating effect of TMX could
be that if strong commitment to team norms is to translate into
effective team functioning over time, these norms must include
individual behavioral expectations that are beneficial to collective
performance. From our study, actions associated with high TMX
(e.g., open communication, feedback) appear to be clear examples
of such beneficial behavior. This moderated effect may also explain why Norm Acceptance did not predict end-state performance. It may be necessary to measure if teams have developed
productive and beneficial norms for Norm Acceptance to predict
end-state performance.

Limitations and Future Research
Despite the contributions of our results, limitations of the study
are important to note and can provide potentially fruitful areas for
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future research. First, the simulation used in our study should not
necessarily be viewed as an ideal task for examining intrateam
dynamics. The manner in which the simulation was performed did
not allow for identification of individual-level contributions, behaviors, and decisions or the particulars of between-person communication and coordination (e.g., role definitions, communication
networks, backing up behaviors). In addition, teams were intact
over the 5-week period, and earlier performance likely influenced
later team performance. Although our analyses accounted for
dependency over time, we did not account for potential interactions between different facets of psychological collectivism and
team performance over time. For example, if a team is composed
of members with a low concern for others and has poor initial team
performance, Goal Priority (which was found to affect later performance) may matter less, because low initial performance may
disrupt what the team can accomplish later. Thus, although we
were able to uncover multiple and differential relationships across
longitudinal team performance, we could not tease apart many of
the complexities of team performance change and intragroup processes that likely serve as explanatory mechanisms of the psychological collectivism and team performance relationships. Future
research should include measures, manipulations, or tasks that are
sensitive to such mechanisms in order to better depict how psychological collectivism contributes to team performance over time.
Second, teams participated in a task designed to simulate decision making in top management teams. It could be that project
teams— or teams charged with a more creative task—would not
benefit from composing teams of members high on the affiliative
facets (Preference or Concern). Teams of individualists often generate more ideas and are more creative than teams of collectivists
(Goncalo & Staw, 2006). This is thought to be because individualists value expressing uniqueness whereas collectivists value cooperation and solidarity. The implication might be that project
teams would not benefit from collectivism facets that reflect an
affinity toward and an attraction to the team (Preference or Concern) but would still benefit from facets that help to motivate team
members to expend effort toward the team’s creative task (e.g.,
Goal Priority).
Third, our performance metric was a composite of objective
team performance measures (e.g., return on assets). Facets such as
Concern may be more important for outcomes such as team
satisfaction and team viability (Barrick, Stewart, Neubert, &
Mount, 1998; Hackman, 1987). Future research could investigate
the relationship between facets of psychological collectivism and
these outcomes as well as important emergent states, such as team
efficacy (Marks et al., 2001). Although we found Reliance was
negatively related to initial team performance, it could be that a
willingness to rely on the team is important for the development of
team efficacy (i.e., the belief in the team’s capability to effectively
perform the task; Bandura, 1997; Gully, Incalcaterra, Joshi, &
Beaubien, 2002). The development of team efficacy is important to
team functioning, as team efficacy is thought to be related to
regulatory processes such that the team will set higher goals,
maintain effort for longer periods of time, and address obstacles
preventing task completion with more confidence (Bandura, 1997;
Pescosolido, 2003).
Fourth, although we examined team members’ perceptions of
the quality of cooperation as a moderator of the psychological
collectivism and team performance relationship, there are in-
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trateam processes that likely serve as important links between the
facets of psychological collectivism and team performance. Future
studies could include specific processes measures (e.g., team monitoring, backup behavior, conflict management) to determine if
particular facets predict the extent to which team members engage
in particular processes ultimately benefiting team performance.
For example, as mentioned, it is unclear if Reliance is related to
team performance through backup behaviors or some other mechanism. Further, members high on Concern may be more likely to
engage in better interpersonal processes, such as conflict management, which are thought to be related to team performance (Marks
et al., 2001).
Fifth, the teams in our sample performed over the course of a
5-week period. In the broader world of work, teams could remain
intact and perform for much longer durations. Thus, some of the
effects we found may still be developing. Despite the time frame
of the current study we did find several significant relationships for
facets of psychological collectivism, and these effects differentiated according to initial and end-state performance stages and
performance as it unfolded over time. Nonetheless, longer performance periods may allow other relationships not found in our
study to emerge. For example, perhaps higher levels of Concern
could be beneficial in more mature intact teams. In such situations
more socioemotional behavior could promote effective performance, as these teams have most likely formed and adjusted their
task strategies and routines.
Sixth, in order to focus our study, we made several decisions in
regard to the measurement of variables and analyses used to test
the relationships. We argued that elevated levels of psychological
collectivism would be beneficial for team functioning and examined the extent to which mean levels of psychological collectivism
predicted team performance. Although we controlled for teamlevel variability, additional research on the extent to which other
operationalizations that reflect alternative distributions of psychological collectivism are related to team performance may be worth
pursuing. Research has suggested that deep-level diversity in terms
of values can influence team functioning and outcomes such as
satisfaction, commitment to stay in the team, and attraction to the
team (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999). Our results suggest that
variability on Goal Priority and Concern has a role in effective
team performance and warrants further research. Further, our models posited a linear change function for longitudinal team performance. Although our results indicated that linear change described
a large proportion of within-team performance change (76%),
variance in this change parameter remained. This suggests that
future research could benefit from modeling nonlinear forms of
change and including more time points than did the current study
to allow for a more thorough depiction of different change patterns.
Finally, given our support for the differential validity of the
facets in terms of predicting team performance, future research
should continue to incorporate psychological collectivism (Jackson et al., 2006) in the study of team-member behavior. Although
we used Kozlowski et al.’s (1999) theory of compilation and
performance to guide our longitudinal hypotheses, we did not
directly investigate the individual team-member behaviors that
contribute to the different compilation phases (e.g., role compilation). Future research could investigate how the specific behaviors
of team members high on Preference and Concern facets affect

role development and differentiation. Similar research on teammember personality has linked individual traits to team outcomes
using roles (Stewart, Fulmer, & Barrick, 2005).

Practical Implications and Conclusions
Our findings hold several implications for practice. Similar to
those of Jackson et al. (2006), our results provide evidence that
psychological collectivism could be useful in selection systems
where work roles are embedded in team contexts or require interpersonal cooperation for successful performance. One caveat to
this use is that our findings indicate that certain aspects of psychological collectivism may require additional time to translate
into more effective performance. Thus, practitioners seeking to
validate psychological collectivism for selection purposes would
be well advised to capture multiple time points of team performance.
Team training and development efforts may benefit from the
inclusion of psychological collectivism. For example, a common
practice in team building is to incorporate assessments of personality or work styles to increase both self-awareness and understanding of individual differences. Assessments of psychological
collectivism could be included in such developmental assessments.
With regard to team training, instruction focused on behaviors that
are congruent to more collectivistic task strategies could be used.
Here, it would seem that behaviors representative of some facets of
psychological collectivism might be more easily trained. For instance, teaching individuals the importance of prioritizing team
goals over individual goals (Goal Priority), as well as the value of
defining and gaining buy-in to team norms (Norm Acceptance), is
likely to be more malleable than influencing Preference for teams
or Concern for others. Our findings of the moderating effects of
TMX hold implications for team training efforts as well. For
example, many models of team training routinely include aspects
of cooperation as key learning components (Salas & CannonBowers, 2000). Empirical evidence also indicates that training
aimed at improving intrateam communication and interaction can
increase the adaptability of the team (Marks, Zaccaro, & Mathieu,
2000). Expanding team training efforts to enhancing the quality of
interpersonal exchanges could be a natural extension of such
programs.

Conclusion
Given the continued interest in creating and developing effective teams within organizations, we investigated the influence of
psychological collectivism and TMX on team performance over
time. Our findings add to the research on psychological collectivism and performance in team contexts in three important ways.
First, we extend Jackson et al.’s (2006) developmental work linking psychological collectivism to individual-level performance to
the team level. In doing so, we find differential effects across
facets providing further support for a multifaceted approach to
examining psychological collectivism. Second, by applying a temporal lens to the study of psychological collectivism and team
performance, we show that the relative importance of the different
facets in terms of predicting performance varies as teams perform
over time. Third, our findings indicate the value of directly assessing the key factor often credited for the effects of collectivism on
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performance, namely, the quality of cooperation among team
members. We believe our results bring clarity to the observed
collectivism and team performance relationships and provide potentially useful information for practitioners.
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